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CASES NOTED
must be specifically confined to a consideration of time and place of the
speech. When the discretion extends to a determination of the permissible
contents of a speech, the statute is unconstitutional. 2
In the present case, the statute in question makes no provision for
any discretionary action. However, the court decided that a discretionary
power of revocation was implied. But the necessary standards of limi-
tation upon the discretion of the commissioner are not present in the
statute. Nor did the court, through its decision, provide a basis upon
which permits may be refused. Rather, it only finds a power to prevent
possible religious riots analogous to the power to ban all raucously noisy
advertising devices.2 3 The court decided that defendant had no constitu-
tional right to wantonly wound the feelings of others and thus create a
possibility of riot necessitating the presence of police. But, the fact that
a speech arouses animosity is not a sufficient clear and present danger of
a substantial evil to justify restraint.2 4 Nor can free speech he suppressed
under the guise of maintaining desirable conditions." It may be that the
speech came within the fighting words doctrine of the Chaplinsky case 6
and that defendant could have been punished for a breach of the peace.
However, an absolute restraint upon the right to speak in the future be-
cause of past misconduct is not in keeping with the Supreme Court's views.2 7
Though the statute requiring a permit for street preaching appears to
be constitutional on its face as being only a necessary and reasonable regu-
lation of the use of public streets, the court's decision has placed an un-
constitutional power of discretion and censorship in the police commis-
sioner, such decision being as effective as if the statute had been so amend-
ed.2 8 Because of the unlimited power of discretion by the commissioner,
the statute should be held unconstitutional without the necessity of de-
ciding if the defendant's action came either within the C/.'plinsky rule
or created a clear and present danger of a substantial evil.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
SEARCH OF PREMISES WITHOUT WARRANT REASONABLE
AS INCIDENT TO LEGAL ARREST
Federal officers, knowing well in advance that defendant had committed
the crime of selling forged and altered postal stamps with intent to defraud'
22. Hague v. C.I.O., supra; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) Lovell v. City
of Griffin, supra.
23. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). See also 3 MIAMI L.Q. 452 (1949).
24. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
25. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 514- (1939).
26. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, mlupra at 572.
27. Near v. Minnesota, supra; but cf. Milk Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Co., 312
U.S. 287 (1941) (Picketing enjoined because of past violence).
28. See Winters v. New York, 33 U.S. 507, 514 (1947).
1. IS U.S.C. § 268 (1946).
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and was probably committing the further crime of possessing and concealing
them with the same intent, 2 arrested him in his one-room office under a
valid arrest warrant. Over his objection and without a search warrant, they
searched his desk, safe and file cabinets for an hour and a half, finding and
seizing many stamps which later proved to be forgeries. His motions to
suppress and strike the seized evidence denied, he was convicted on both
counts. The court of appeals reversed the conviction.3 Held, on certiorari,
judgment reversed and conviction affirmed. The search and seizure as inci-
dent to a legal arrest were reasonable and not within the prohibition of the
Fourth Amendment, 4 even though the officers had time in which to procure
a search warrant and failed to do so. United States v. Rabinowitz, 70 Sup.
Ct. 430 (1950).
While recognizing the resulting restraint on enforcement of the criminal
laws, the Supreme Court has often declared that the Fourth Amendment
should be liberally construed in favor of the individual 5 However, it has
never been held to require that every valid search and seizure be
effected under the authority of a search warrant.6 It is only those searches
that are unreasonable that fall within the Constitutional prohibition.7 Thus
the right to search, without warrant, the person of the accused as an incident
to a legal arrest s was early established in English and American law 9 and is
no longer questioned.' 0 Similarly, the right exists to seize, without warrant,
goods and papers on ships'' or other moving vehicles,' 2 where it is known to
a competent official authorized to search that there is probable cause far
believing that the vehicle is carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.',3
The reason for this holding is based on necessity, far were it not so a vehicle
could be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant must
2. 18 U.S.C. § 265 (1946).
3. United States v. Rabinowitz, 176 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1949).
4. U. S. CoNST. AMEND. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not e violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.")
5. See Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932); United States v. Lcfkowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932), Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 197 (1927);
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32 (1927); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921)i Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
6. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947).
7. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
8. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
9. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914-).
10. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932)i Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
11. United States v. Lee, supra.
12. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). But cf. United States v. Di Re, supra at 584-586.
13. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Carroll v. United States, supra.
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be sought. The third and most recent development, not yet fully formulated,
is that of a reasonable search of the premises incident to a legal arrest.
Suggested by the Court in three earlier cases, 1" it was not until Marron v.
United States'5 that the suggestion emerged in a direct holding.
Under this theory the arrest upon which the search and seizure is to be
based must be valid, i.e., either lawfully made on a legal warrant for the
offense charged in the initial complaint,' 6 or, where there is no arrest
warrant, it must be justifiable as having been made for a felony, by officers
believing upon probable cause that the person committed it and that when
arrested he was actually engaged in the commission of a crime.' 7 For the
Government to invoke this proposition the offender must be present on the
premises during the search,' 8 While the right covers a search of the place
where the arrest is made, it does not extend to other places.' 9 The search
is not limited only to the room wh~ere the arrest occurs:20 it may extend to
all parts of the premises tinder the arrestee's immediate control, including
a closet 2' or a bedroom.2 Similarly, the character of the place searched
is not conclusive, 23 although it appears that stricter requirements of
reasonableness may be applied where a dwelling is being searched. 4 The
subject matter which may be seized includes all things used in the criminal
enterprise, 5 the fruits of the crime, and weapons and other implements
with which an escape from custody can be effected. 26 Furthermore, the evi-
dence seized need not relate to the crimes charged in the warrant of arrest if
it does, in fact, relate to some crime.' 7
It has been said that the legal arrest doctrine does not condone general
exploratory searches.28 The cases standing for this principle distinguish
themselves by showing that the evidence seized was not "visible and
14. Agnello V. United States, stlpra; Carroll v. United States, suptra Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
15. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
16. E.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, supra.
17. E.g., Marron v. United States, sutpra.
18. Taylor v. United States, 286 I'.S. 1 (1932)i Agisello v. I'nited States, slipra.
19. Agnello v. United States, supra (a house several blocks froin the scene of the
arrest).
20. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
21, Marron v. United States, supra.
22. Harris v. United States, supra.
23. Ibid.
24. Set Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 592 (1946) ; MIatthews v. Correa, 135
F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1943).
25. Marron v. United States, supra (a ledger held seizable as part of the equipment
used to violate Prohibition Act).
26. See Agnello v. United States, supra at 30.
27. Harris v. United States, supra (the warrants of arrest charged violations of the
Mail Fraud Statute and the National Stolen Property Act, while the things seized were
draft cards, the possession of which was an unrelated crime).
28. United States v. Lefkowitz, supra; Go-liart Iporting Co. v. United States, supra.
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accessible" 29 or "in plain view."3 0 If this be the only distinction, it was
removed by the Harris case, where the Court permitted a painstaking five-
hour search and seizure of things not visible and accessible, yet was careful
to refer to this as other than an exploratory search, In doing this the Court
was in effect changing the meaning of "general" from a general physical
search to a search with a general mental intent. The import of the Harris
case was to leave a single decisive factor. That is, the intent and purpose of
the searching officers as evidence in the modus operandi of effecting the
valid arrest, either in the arrest warrant or in the crime being committed
in their presence. Whether something in particular was being sought became
the sole question.3
In Trupiano v. United States,"2 the proponents of a strict interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment having mustered a bare majority, the Court held
that search warrants must be secured and used wherever reasonably prac-
ticable, even when the search is incident to a legal arrest.3' The instant cdse
expressly overrules the Trupiano decision and rejects the test of the apparent
need for summary seizure applied therein. The opinion reasserts the new
interpretation of the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases" laid down in Harris
v. United States. It is submitted, inasmuch as the arrest exception by-
passes the constitutional necessities of having to name with particularity
the property sought 35 and the place to be searched, 36 that this extension
should not be without due deliberation. 7 Furthermore, with the probability
almost upon us that the law will reach out and embrace a new category of
political offenses,'8 it would seem that the Court should be less anxious
to narrow its prior interpretations of the Amendment in such fashion
than it appears to be.
29. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, supra.
30. United States v. Lefkowirz, supra.
31. Contra, see Frankfurter, J. in Harris v. United States, supra at 162 (dissenting
opinion) (" 'Unreasonable' is not to be determined with reference to a particular search
and seizure considered in isolation. The treason' by which search and seizure is to be
tested is the 'reason' that was written out of historic experience into the Fourth Amend-
ment. This means that, with minor and severely confined exceptions, inferentially a part
of the Amendment, every search and seizure is unreasonable when made without a magis-
trate's authority expressed through a validly issued warrant.")
32. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
33. Although the opinion limited the holding to cases wherein the officers were aware
of the precise nature and location of the evidence long before making the arrest, in
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) the principle was applied with this
factor absent.
34. See note 28 supra.
35. Marron v. United States, supra at 196.
36. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
37. See Butler, J. in United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
38. " . . . nor should we forget that what seems fair enough against a squalid huck-
ster of bad liquor may take on a very different face, if used by a government determined to
suppress political opposition under the guise of sedition." Hand, J. in United States v.
Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
